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India’s nuclear build-up, which culminated in the 1998 nuclear tests and India’s 
subsequent self-declaration as a nuclear power, bears several puzzles for academic 
research in the field of strategic studies, as it appears difficult to identify clear 
strategic motives behind it. In its relations to arch rival Pakistan, the introduction of 
nuclear weapons was strategically rather counter productive for India, as the 
equalising effects of these weapons diminished much of India’s overwhelming 
superiority in conventional weaponry. Many academics therefore stress the so-
called ‘China factor’, that is, the threat to Indian security posed by the nuclear-
armed neighbour in the north, as the reason for India’s acquisition of nuclear 
weapons. This argument, however, appears to be not sound enough to solely 
explain the course of India’s nuclearisation, as the conflicting interests at stake are 
of too little relevance to justify the substantial financial and political sacrifice 
involved. Thus, a majority of studies on the nuclear build-up in South Asia 
concludes that a significant, if not dominating part of the explanatory variables lies 
outside of the classical strategic realm. However, stringent explanatory models 
which account for the key role of non-strategic motives behind India’s nuclear 
build-up are largely missing. Prime objective of the present paper is to reduce this 
gap by sketching a possible model to explain how the interplay of several 
contradicting national interests at stake, being either strategic or non-strategic in 
nature, contributed to India’s decision to pass the nuclear threshold. 
Within the applied model, the structure of the international system in South 
Asia clearly sets the framework for India’s international action. Structural 
conditions, however, are not transformed directly into India’ strategic policy 
formulation, but rather distorted by  intervening  factors  at  the national  level. The 
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strong threat perception emerging from Pakistan among India’s elite, and, at the 
same time, the remarkable indifference of the elite as well as public at large 
towards China, does not correspond to the actual relative power capabilities within 
the system, nor do these threat perceptions sufficiently explain India’s nuclear 
course. 
The present model, which is itself based on the paradigms of Neo-classical 
Realism, departs from conventional explanatory models in two fundamental 
aspects: First, state interaction is not exclusively explained by the structure of the 
international system, but rather by the interplay between systemic variables such as 
the states’ relative power capabilities, and intervening variables at the unit-level. 
Second, state interests are not defined exclusively in terms of security 
maximisation. The emphasis of the present paper on an in-depth analysis of the 
particular interests at stake appears justified considering the non-security motives 
behind India’s self-declaration as nuclear weapon state.  
The paper starts with a general description of the South Asian context within 
the field of International Relations, and the particularities of this region in regard to 
the applicability of the conventional IR models. Then, the international system 
which sets the framework for India’s strategic policy-making is outlined. 
The central part of the paper is an evaluation of intervening factors on the 
national level. Several domestic dynamics within India’s policy decision-making 
process regularly overlap structural conditions in shaping India’s national interest 
formulation. The most striking interests at stake are India’s aversion to the existing 
international non-proliferation regime, as well as domestic factors, such as India’s 
ad hoc, non-institutionalised nuclear decision-making process, dynamics emerging 
from India’s democratic structure, and the key role of certain pressure groups like 
the defence scientists and the strategic analysts. 
 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  R E L A T I O N S  A N D  F O R E I G N  P O L I C Y :  
T H E  S O U T H  A S I A N  C O N T E X T  
 
Structural theories of International Relations such as Neorealism try to explain the 
outcomes of state interaction by focusing on its systemic, or structural causes. State 
behaviour is determined by its respective power relative to the power capabilities 
of other states within the international system. As such, only broad assumptions on 
unit-level variations in state behaviour as intervening variables are made. 
Much of the debate on Neorealism focuses on the nature of the international 
system2. Liberal critics usually question the validity of the anarchy assumption, 
which they found particularly difficult to uphold in an increasingly globalised 
world and the emergence of international non-state actors3. When it comes to the 
South Asian arena, however, this criticism falls somehow short. In fact, the South 
                                                 
2 For an overview on this debate see: Keohane: 1986; and Buzan: 1993. 
3 Constructivists reject the realist anarchy assumption by claiming that the interrelation 
between states is generally constructed by people’s identity and socialization. See: 
Alexander Wendt: 1992. For Constructivism and Indo-Pakistani relations see: Subrata K. 
Mitra: 2001. 
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Asian strategic set-up can truly be described as being anarchic. A broad security 
architecture as well as substantive regional security agreements are missing. 
Neither India nor Pakistan are members of the main international nuclear regimes, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). The UN is largely discredited due to its clumsy mediation attempts in the 
Kashmir question. The agenda of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-
operation (SAARC) as the only institutionalised platform for regional co-operation 
explicitly excludes bilateral security issues. Intra-regional trade so far remains 
minimal, mainly due to the similarly structured, non-complementary economies of 
the South Asian countries. 
According to Neorealist theory, states place security maximising at the top of 
the lexicographic preference system, trying to improve their security through 
relative power gains vis-à-vis their counterparts within the international anarchic 
self-help system (Van Evera: 1999). Interaction between states is determined by 
their relative power capabilities as well as their mutual threat perceptions. 
Applying this assumption to the nuclear relations between India and Pakistan 
would neglect the existence of non-security state interests, and it would fail to 
explain India’s acceptance to actually lose in relative power capabilities vis-à-vis 
Pakistan when it decided to spark off the chain of mutual testing and deploying of 
nuclear devices. 
 While the Realist paradigms are generally well suited to explain much of the 
long term course of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, the abstract limitation to 
structural factors by its mainstream Neorealist variant, i.e. the assumption that only 
security maximising determines state action in the international arena, appears 
rather inadequate, as it veils more than it reveals in the South Asian case. 
Assuming that security considerations explain much but not all of the nuclear 
build-up in South Asia, any explanatory model would have to incorporate a set of 
different factors within the national interest composition. These factors are either 
structural, or unit-level based. 
Theories which are termed as ‘Neo-classical Realist’ theories generally accept 
the supremacy of structural factors, i.e. the distribution of relative power, over 
domestic factors as the main determinants of state action within the international 
system. However,  
 
“the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect 
and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through 
intervening variables at the unit level. (..) . Neo-classical realists argue 
that relative power establishes the basic parameters of a country’s 
foreign policy; they note, in Thucydides’ formula, that ‘the strong do 
what they can and the weak suffer what they must’. Yet they point out 
that there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material 
capabilities to foreign policy behaviour” (Rose: 1998, pp. 146,147). 
 
In short, the structure of the international system sets the framework of a state’s 
long-term international goals, whereas unit-level variations in state behaviour 
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display as interfering variables responsible for short-term changes in foreign 
policy. The incentives which guide the state’s foreign policy formulation are 
termed state (or national) interests. Key question is thereby whether the existing 
international system is accommodative towards the particular state’s interests, or 
whether the interests drive the state to pursue a policy of system change. 
The initiation of a (nuclear) arms race is explained by the dissatisfaction of one 
state with the status quo, which is perceived as unfavourable to its varied national 
interests. The interaction between a dissatisfied state and its security-seeking 
opponent is thereby one-sided in the sense that the security seeker is reacting to 
preserve its security, whereas the dissatisfied state is building up arms 
independently from the opponents’ reaction to it. In this scenario, the action-
reaction model of state behaviour leading to security dilemma as described in the 
Balance-of-Power Theory does not apply. 
According to Hans J. Morgenthau, a state whose policy is to seek a change in 
its actual power status, pursues a policy of imperialism, whereas the state whose 
policy is to keep power pursues a policy of status quo (Morgenthau: revised edition 
1993; pp. 29-34). Similarly, Randall L. Schweller states that “revisionist states seek 
to undermine the established order for the purpose of increasing their power and 
prestige in the system; that is, they seek to increase, not just to maintain, their 
resources.. . Revisionist powers are typically those states which lost the last major-
power war and / or have increased their power after the international order was 
established and the benefits were allocated” (Schweller, in: Feaver, Peter D.: 2000; 
p.177). Instead of using the terms ‘imperialist’ or ‘revisionist’, this study refers to 
the term ‘dissatisfied power’ to describe those states which consider the status quo 
as sub-optimal to their national interests, and to ‘status-quo power’ to those states 
which seek to preserve the current international system as matching best their 
national interests. As Schweller quite rightly notes, the incentives for dissatisfied 
powers to seek a revision of the international order are not necessarily predatory. 
Rather, a revision might be regarded as necessary to enhance a state’s defensive 
goals within its strategic environment (Schweller 2000; p.177). The composition of 
a state’s national interest determines the strength of revisionist or status quo 
oriented incentives of state behaviour. If those interests which favour a change in 
the international system outweigh the interests satisfied by the status quo, the state 
acts as dissatisfied power. 
The interrelation between power capabilities (structure) and state interests 
(agency) and their link to policy decisions of the respective South Asian states as 
well as the way these states interact are modelled along the Theory of Balance of 
Interests4. “The concept of balance of interests has a dual meaning, one at the unit 
level, the other at the systemic level. At the unit level, it refers to the costs a state is 
willing to pay to defend the status quo relative to the costs it is willing to pay to 
modify it. At the systemic level, it refers to the relative strength of status-quo and 
revisionist states” (Schweller 1998; pp. 83,84). 
                                                 
4 The term ‘Balance-of-Interest Theory’ was first introduced by Randall L. Schweller 
(Schweller: 1998). 
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Along this concept, India clearly qualifies as a dissatisfied power in terms of its 
nuclear build-up, wanting to improve its position within the system. The 
international nuclear order established in the 1960s is perceived by India as neither 
serving its interests nor reflecting its increased economic as well as power 
resources and depriving it of its appropriate status, while at the same time granting 
this status to both former South Asian colonial powers, Britain and France, as well 
as to China. 
In the case of Pakistan, determining revisionist incentives for its nuclear 
proliferation is a more complex task. Pakistan’s irredentist goals towards territory 
in Kashmir have been one of the major factors in Indo-Pakistani antagonism since 
independence. Until 1965, Pakistan considered the existing order, in which India 
occupies most of Kashmir, as highly intolerable, and it was willing to take a great 
risk to improve it. After the war of 1965, and further after the secession of 
Bangladesh in 1971, Pakistan, although still being a dissatisfied power in Kashmir, 
became too weak to push its irredentist goals through by military means. At this 
stage, a clear methodological distinction has to be made between the national 
interests determining the acquisition of conventional power capabilities, and those 
determining the build-up of nuclear power capabilities. While the Pakistani 
conventional arms build-up appears to be mainly caused by its dissatisfaction with 
the status quo in Kashmir, its nuclear proliferation is not. Nuclear weapons are of 
no use in limited territorial disputes. Rather, Pakistan’s military planners consider 
nuclear devices as defensive weapons in order to deter the superior Indian military 
force from a large-scale attack, being either nuclear or conventional. Thus, in 
contrast to its conventional arms build-up, within the nuclear arms race Pakistan 
qualifies as status-quo power. 
By clearly marking India as dissatisfied, and Pakistan as satisfied power in the 
nuclear competition, India is seen as the prime actor, while Pakistan as a reacting 
power plays only a secondary role in determining the course of the nuclear arms 
race in South Asia. Therefore, the further analysis will focus on the Indian case. It 
is done by first looking at the structural causes, and, in a second step, addressing 
the intervening, unit-level dynamics behind the nuclear arms race. 
 
 
T H E  S O U T H  A S I A N  S T R A T E G I C  A R E N A  
 
D e t e r r e n c e  i n  I n d o - P a k i s t a n  R e l a t i o n s  
 
Prior to the introduction of nuclear weapons, the conflict over Kashmir was the 
crucial factor determining the course of the bilateral relations. In 1998, the 
breakthrough of the South Asian nuclear arms race after the tests had a significant 
impact on the bilateral strategic interaction between India and Pakistan. As 
Kenneth Waltz argues, “big changes in means of transportation, communication, 
and war fighting, for example, strongly affect how states and other agents interact. 
Such changes occur at the unit level. In modern history, or perhaps in all of history, 
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the introduction of nuclear weaponry was the greatest of such changes” (Waltz: 
2000; p.5). 
The most significant change in the relationship between India and Pakistan is 
the emergence of deterrence as dominant feature of bilateral interaction. Deterrence 
threats are meant to reduce the expected utility for the adversary of going to war by 
increasing the potential costs of doing so. Another objective of deterrence is to 
prevent the adversary from forcing maximum demands upon the state in the course 
of bilateral bargaining. 
In contrast to conventional deterrence, nuclear deterrence plays only an indirect 
role in regional territorial disputes. It is not primarily directed at preventing a 
limited military attack to seize the disputed territory, but to prevent a large-scale 
military attack to occupy the disputed territory only after decisively defeating the 
opponent’s military forces.  
The fundamental paradigm shift in the course of the revelation of both 
countries’ nuclear arsenals was neither guided by a new doctrine nor by any new 
assessment of India’s broad strategic environment. Rather, soon after the tests 
several strategic analysts and government officials began to design possible new 
doctrines in a post hoc fashion. Central to India’s newly formulated deterrence 
posture is a no-first-use doctrine and emphasis on the ‘China Factor’. The explicit 
renunciation of the nuclear first-use option by India is a reassuring move towards 
China, but it failed to have any effect on Indo-Pakistani relations. Due to the 
overwhelming superiority in conventional forces, a nuclear first strike towards 
Pakistan has never been a serious option for India’s military planners anyway. For 
Pakistan, on the other hand, the nuclear first-strike option is crucial due to its geo-
strategic proximity and the inferiority of its conventional forces. Several Pakistani 
officials already indicated that Pakistan could counter a large-scale conventional 
attack by India with nuclear weapons (Carranza:1999; p.15). 
The minimum nuclear deterrence posture adopted by India and Pakistan 
implies the deployment of “the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary to 
inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary even after suffering a nuclear attack” 
(Nicholas Wheeler, cited in Carranza: 1999; p.14) and generally suggests a 
countervalue instead of a counterforce doctrine (Bowen/Wolvén. 1999). 
Nevertheless, both states have failed so far to outline how many they actually 
consider as being the minimum number of devices. 
Due to the geographic proximity and the extremely short warning times, 
aircraft are of little use as secure second-strike delivery vehicles, rather 
contributing to deterrence instability by increasing the dangers of pre-emptive 
strikes. Both states therefore foster the development of mobile land-based ballistic 
missiles. The Indian programme of developing submarines as the potentially best 
delivery system to secure a second-strike capability is decades away from 
completion. 
In its strategic relationship with Pakistan, the introduction of an overt nuclear 
arsenal appeared rather disadvantageous for India. It obviously neither deters the 
insurgents in Kashmir nor the alleged Pakistani assistance to them. While India’s 
concern of the Pakistani nuclear build-up might explain in parts its course of 
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opaque nuclear proliferation until 1998, it fails to explain India’s decision to drop 
this concept and to take the initiative in pulling the regional nuclear arms race into 
the light by testing first and declaring itself a nuclear weapon state. If India would 
not have tested in 1998 and signed the CTBT instead without testing, it would have 
been impossible for Pakistan to resist international pressures and not to have 
followed suit, thus freezing both countries’ nuclear programme and cementing 
India’s then held superiority. 
Generally, empirical evidence suggests that the nuclear capabilities of India 
and Pakistan before and after the 1998 tests might have deterred full-scale war, but 
obviously failed to deter minor skirmishes and low profile war between these two 
rivals along their disputed Kashmir border. However, any conclusion about if and 
how deterrence worked remains vague. “Since successful deterrence results in non-
events, i.e. continued peace, it is logically impossible to prove that nuclear 
deterrence has worked in any given situation” (Hagerty: 1998; p.37). Undisputed 
are the non-strategic dangers of ‘loose nukes’ resulting from the crude nature of the 
nuclear arsenals among newly emerging nuclear powers. 
 
S t r a t e g i c  I n c e n t i v e s  f o r  I n d i a ’ s  N u c l e a r  B u i l d - u p  
 
Most studies on the strategic dynamics of South Asia explain India’s nuclear 
weapons build-up as reaction to the threats posed by Pakistan and China, or both5. 
In fact, much of India’s impetus to proliferate nuclear weapons can be traced to 
prior proliferation dynamics in these two rival countries. The first broader debate 
on the nuclear issue within the Indian polity emerged in the mid-1960s, just after 
China had conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, and only two years after India’s 
defeat by China in the border war of 1962. After a period of nuclear standstill, the 
Indian nuclear programme was revived in the early 1980s after rumours spread that 
Pakistan took strong efforts in fostering its nuclear capabilities. The Indian nuclear 
tests in 1998 were again interpreted by many as reaction to prior proliferation 
dynamics within Pakistan, as it followed Pakistani test firing of the medium-range 
Ghauri ballistic missile, capable of targeting main cities in India. Improvements in 
power capabilities by Pakistan and China often triggered a debate in India, causing 
an increased threat perception. While most of the Indian public saw the nuclear 
tests in 1998 as one step forward towards technological and strategic superiority 
vis-à-vis arch rival Pakistan, most members of the strategic enclave were very well 
aware of the inadequacy of such weapons to gain strategic superiority in its 
bilateral rivalry. In their academic back up, these Pundits rather focus on the threat 
posed by the Chinese nuclear arsenal, and on the rival nature of the national 
interests of these two major Asian powers. According to K. Subrahmanyam, India 
should “adopt a policy of directly befriending China and, at the same time ” pursue 
the establishment of “an Asian and global balance of power system” (K. 
Subrahmanyam, cited in Perkovich: 1999; p. 385), i.e. create equally strong 
                                                 
5 Chinese military assistance to Pakistan heightened Indian perception of a threatening axis 
surrounding India in the north. 
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(nuclear) power capabilities to balance China, just as the Balance-of-Power theory 
suggests.  
This course or argumentation, however, does not hold closer scrutiny. First of 
all, a credible nuclear deterrent towards China would have necessitated secure 
second strike capabilities as well as appropriate ballistic missile delivery vehicles 
to reach key strategic targets, which are located at long distance on China’s east 
coast. Both were far from combat-ready in 1998 and, according to official 
statements, not on top of India’s priority list. Secondly, the tests of 1998 came after 
a period of significant rapprochement between India and China, which was 
initiated by Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988, and culminated in two border 
agreements signed in 1993 and 1996. Prior to the tests, the Chinese government 
sent out signals that its strategic interests were limited to the Taiwan issue and the 
South China Sea, and that it had a strong interest in preserving the status quo at its 
southwestern border with India. Thus, China acts as dissatisfied power at its eastern 
border, while it clearly qualifies as status quo power towards India, both, in 
conventional as well as in nuclear terms. 
The Chinese move to overcome old rivalries and to fundamentally improve its 
relationship with India was not caused by perceived pressures emerging from 
India’s growing military capabilities, but rather due to the growing economic 
attractiveness of the Indian market for Chinese goods and services. In this light, K. 
Subrahmanyam’s view of the natural rivalry of India and China can be seen as one 
more piece in the long record of Indian misperception and misjudgement of 
Chinese moves, signals and intentions. In fact, the only persistent conflict of 
bilateral interests is the still unresolved demarcation of their border. However, the 
two border agreements and the mutual understanding to solve this problem 
peacefully made the repetition of a border war similar to 1962 highly unlikely, and 
a scenario in which such potential open conflict escalates into a nuclear war 
appears unthinkable. Strong improvements of India’s conventional military 
capabilities at its border to China would have foreclosed a repetition of the 
nightmarish events of 1962 anyway, as the potential costs of such open conflict 
would outweigh its potential benefits, considering the rather minor Chinese 
interests at stake. 
Finally, those who consider a nuclear deterrent as an appropriate tool to match 
the Chinese threat still fail to explain the timing of the nuclear tests, as well as the 
necessity to reveal India’s nuclear programme at all, as the concept of existential 
nuclear deterrence which dominated India’s strategy prior to the tests would have 
done the job6. Continued opacity would have further avoided the risks of pre-
emptive strikes and an unleashed nuclear arms race. 
In sum, despite many efforts to explain India’s strategic need for nuclear 
weapons, systemic incentives alone are not sound enough to exclusively explain 
the nuclear dynamics within South Asia.  
                                                 
6 For an introduction in the concept of ‘existential deterrence’ see: Bundy, MacGeorge: 
Existential Deterrence and its Consequences. In: MacLean, Douglas (ed.): The Security 
Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age. Totowa: Rowman and Allanheld 1984. 
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A comprehensive explanation of the dynamics behind India’s acquisition of the 
bomb would have to go beyond the trivial dimension of nuclear bombs as military-
strategic devices, and further include the normative dimension of nuclear weapons 
as the world’s strongest symbols of abstract power. India’s quest for such symbolic 
power gains is driven by its dissatisfaction with the existing international regime. 
Its dissatisfaction is not defined in terms of territory or military capability, but 
rather in terms of international standing and prestige. 
 
E L I T E  P E R C E P T I O N  A N D  T H E  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  S Y S T E M  
 
The following section evaluates the way in which the structural pressures are 
perceived by India’s elite. It will show that the elite’s response to structural 
incentives is less based on the perception of military insecurity, but on 
considerations of international standing, which is sought to be achieved through the 
build-up of power capabilities in general, and nuclear power capabilities in 
particular. The status orientation of India’s foreign policy oscillates between the 
quest for status through power on one side, and India’s pretension of moral 
superiority in the international system on the other. This ambivalence between 
these two contrasting features in India’s normative interest composition became 
most apparent in its often inconsistent position towards the international non-
proliferation regime. 
 
I n d i a  a n d  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n  R e g i m e  
 
One of the motives behind its nuclear build-up has been India’s dissatisfaction with 
the existing discriminatory nuclear regime, which emerged in 1968 after 
concluding the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). When negotiations on the 
extension of the NPT ended in 1995 with a vast majority of states favouring its 
indefinite extension7, India emerged as its only outspoken opponent8. India’s 
almost complete international isolation on this issue, which was further deepened 
by its constant blocking and protracting of the negotiation process in Geneva, is 
even more astonishing considering its long tradition of moral commitment for 
global (nuclear) disarmament. Many, if not most, of the non-nuclear weapon states 
share India’s displeasure about the genuinely discriminatory treaty, which allows 
the five recognised nuclear weapon states9 to maintain their arsenals, while at the 
same time denying the right to possess these weapons to the rest of the community 
of states. The treaty is nevertheless regarded as one (imperfect but indispensable) 
step forward to avoid the global spread of these deadly weapons. Analysts usually 
tend to explain India’s stance by the advanced state of its nuclear programme. 
Signing the treaty in 1995 would have ruined India’s nuclear achievements just 
                                                 
7 179 countries agreed to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, and until 2000, 187 
had signed it. 
8 Next to India, only Pakistan, Israel and Cuba rejected the treaty. Pakistan explicitly 
declared to sign the NPT as soon as India would sign. 
9 The five recognized nuclear weapon states are the United States, Russia, China, France, 
Great Britain. 
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short before it could cross the finishing line, i.e. develop a full-fledged nuclear 
arsenal. This explanation appears reasonable regarding the strong lobbying efforts 
of the scientific community to avoid any agreement which would put restrictions 
on their work. However, it overlooks the general anti-colonialist and nationalist 
dynamics behind India’s policy. Paradoxically, the first NPT negotiations in the 
late 1960s and the negotiations on its indefinite extension in the mid-1990s gave 
impetus to India’s nuclear programme, rather than averting nuclear proliferation. 
Similar dynamics were in place during negotiations on the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT)10 in 1996, and during continued bilateral negotiations on non-
proliferation issues with the USA. According to many analysts, the increasing 
isolation and the emerging pressures to finally join the international non-
proliferation regime account for India’s decision to not further delay its nuclear 
programme, to conduct nuclear tests in 1998 and subsequently declare itself a 
nuclear weapon state. This argument would have suggested that India - followed by 
Pakistan - signs both NPT and CTBT soon after the events of 1998. However, India 
did not. Instead, the Indian government followed the line which had already 
determined its policy of ‘keeping the nuclear option open’ since the beginning: It 
tried to satisfy the domestic audience by resisting international pressure and 
refusing formal acceptance of NPT and CTBT, which were perceived unjust and 
neo-colonialist. To calm the international audience, the Indian government 
declared its will not to violate the treaties even without any formal signature.  
At the end of the day, the nuclear tests did not fundamentally change India’s 
and Pakistan’s stance on the international non-proliferation regime. India continues 
to formally reject NPT and CTBT as discriminatory, and continues to avoid the 
implementation of any restrictions on its nuclear programme. Due to its perceived 
strategic position, Pakistan continues to demand India to sign first before it would 
join the regime. 
The anti-colonialist reflex triggered by the negotiations on NPT and CTBT 
prevented India’s elite to discern the potential benefits of those treaties to India’s 
security. First of all, if India had joined the NPT without testing, it would have 
been impossible for Pakistan to resist international pressure and refrain from 
signing. The technical advantage India had over Pakistan in the nuclear field prior 
to the tests would have been preserved. A second and more important aspect of the 
international nuclear regime, which has been widely ignored in the Indian debate, 
is the strong pressure on the existing nuclear weapon states not to exercise any 
form of nuclear threat to non-nuclear weapon states. Any nuclear threat in a 
potential conflict with a non-nuclearised India would have been prohibitive to 
China as it would have caused enormous international damage. By openly 
acquiring a (however imperfect) nuclear deterrent device, India lost this strategic 
benefit. 
                                                 
10 To come into force, CTBT regularities require the signature of 44 key states with nuclear 
potential. Among these, only India, Pakistan, and Israel refused to sign. Similar to the NPT 
negotiations, Pakistan signalled that it would sign the CTBT as soon as India does. India 
initially was in favour of the treaty, but finally rejected it. 
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In sum, the heated domestic debate on the non-proliferation issue foreclosed any 
pragmatic, more beneficial policy, and made India insist on its stubborn position. 
Unfortunately, India’s position was further hardened by the attitudes of the 
recognised nuclear weapon states, which themselves derive much of their 
international standing and power from their arsenals. As Devin T. Hagerty wrote: 
“Paradoxically, it is mainly Washington’s attitude, not New Delhi’s or 
Islamabad’s, that ensures the continuing legitimacy of nuclear weapons. .. . The 
dictum ‘do as we say, not as we do’ is hypocritical” (Hagerty 1998; p.195). 
Reactions to the tests in Western capitals, such as the U.S. Senate’s call on the 
Clinton administration to pressurise New Delhi to reverse its policy and give up 
nuclear weapons completely, caused immediate objection by India and deepened 
its anti-colonialist sentiments. 
 
N e h r u v i a n  T r a d i t i o n ,  A n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m ,  a n d  N a t i o n a l i s m  
i n  I n d i a ’ s  F o r e i g n  P o l i c y  
 
Since Independence, India’s foreign and security policy has been decisively 
determined by the Prime Minister. His or her moral beliefs and personal identity 
shaped the Indian nuclear policy more than informed strategic analyses. The 
concept of ‘keeping the nuclear option open’, which determined India’s course of 
nuclear proliferation until 1998, was the result of two contradicting ideas about 
India’s role within the community of states, on which India’s Prime Ministers were 
agonising since the nuclear question emerged in the early 1950s. “Two vital norms 
coexist uneasily within this identity: one, India should achieve major power status 
in the international system and, two, India should demonstrate moral superiority 
over the world’s dominant states, which have been perceived as exploitative, 
overly militarised, and insensitive to the needs and aspirations of the world’s 
majority of poor people. These two norms have clashed in the nuclear policy 
arena” (Perkovich: 1999; p.448). The difficulty to accommodate both norms 
became apparent in Nehru’s speeches in the early 1960s, in which he explicitly 
announced India’s goal to achieve the necessary skills to manufacture nuclear 
weapons, while, at the same time, categorically declaring that India would never 
build the bomb. This stance has often been misunderstood by Western listeners as 
somehow hypocritical rhetoric. It was nevertheless India’s attempt to uphold its 
moral stance, and, at the same time, find its place in the international system, in 
which the possession of such unusable weapons greatly determine a state’s 
standing and power. After Nehru’s death in 1964, his successors Lal Bahadur 
Shastri (1964-1966) and Indira Gandhi (1966-77, 1980-1984) initially tried to 
continue this ambiguous policy. However, external pressures emerging from the 
first Chinese nuclear test in 1964, and continued negotiations on the NPT, as well 
as domestic pressures emerging from government instability, made the government 
prone to populist considerations and it started to pursue a more vigorous nuclear 
policy. After the so called ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ in 1974, the nuclear 
programme in India came to a temporary end. Two reasons mainly account for this 
policy shift: First, the nuclear issue failed to pay its hoped-for dividends in terms of 
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domestic popularity. Second, the firm international reaction causing severe 
political and economic damage took the Indian government by surprise. Indira 
Gandhi’s successor as Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, felt more than any other 
Prime Minister before and after committed to the high moral standards of Indian 
foreign policy, and fiercely opposed the development of nuclear weapons. India’s 
nuclear programme was not revived before Indira Gandhi’s return to power in 
1980. It was resumed after rumours spread about Pakistan’s increasing efforts in 
the nuclear field. This was somehow ironic: Pakistan’s nuclear programme was 
triggered by India’s nuclear explosion in 1974, and grew rapidly since the mid-
1970s just at the time when India’s programme was halted. Then, in 1980, India 
resumed its programme under the impression of an increased nuclear threat by 
Pakistan. This episode shows the fatal action-reaction dynamics which were set in 
motion once the Pandora’s box of nuclear proliferation had been opened.  
When Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, she was confronted with 
widespread social unrest, and secessionist movements in Punjab and in the 
Northeast threatened India’s integrity. In this context, the widely perceived threat 
from Pakistan was welcomed by Indira to gather public support behind her troubled 
central government. However, similar to 1974 and 1998, this strategy failed to have 
much effect. Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards in 1984, and 
succeeded by her son Rajiv, who continued his mother’s nuclear policy with few 
changes. 
The downfall of the Rajiv Gandhi government (1984-1989) not only put a end 
to the rule of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty in Indian politics, but also marked the 
transformation of the single-party dominated political landscape into a multi-party 
system. In the following decade, changing coalitions ruled the country in quick 
succession. This system change had significant implications on India’s foreign and 
security policy. In contrast to earlier governments, the coalition governments since 
1989 felt less committed to the Nehruvian vision of an international system based 
on moral standards, not power. The struggle between the two contradicting norms 
of India’s foreign policy was now decided in favour of power politics. Apparently, 
governments only disagreed in how India should achieve greater international 
power and leverage. While Prime Minister Narasimha Rao (1991-1996) sought 
India to gain power first of all through economic growth, the succeeding BJP-
governments under Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee (1996; since 1998) 
sought to raise India’s standing and prestige in the world first and foremost through 
military strength. 
Rao’s economy-first policy slowed down but did not stop the nuclear 
programme. The scientists proceeded with the development of missiles as delivery 
vehicles and concluded preparations to conduct further nuclear tests, which were 
considered necessary to optimise the atomic chain reaction in order to make 
nuclear warheads suitable for missile delivery. Rao appeared to have authorised 
these preparations personally, but restrained from actually authorising the 
detonations (Perkovich: 1999; p.365). After the downfall of the Rao government, 
his successor Vajpayee authorised nuclear tests immediately, but he withdrew his 
authorisation as soon as it became apparent that his government would not survive 
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the upcoming vote of confidence. The following governments led by Deve Gowda 
(1996-1997) and Inder Kumar Gujral (1997-1998) marked an exception in India’s 
foreign policy. During Gowda’s term, for the first time ever, foreign policy was not 
made primarily in the Prime Minister’s office, but within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Then-Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral, who would become Prime 
Minister himself in 1997, developed a new doctrine for India’s foreign policy 
based on regional co-operation and unilateral confidence building efforts. His 
careful diplomacy increased India’s stature within and outside the South Asian 
region. Towards Pakistan, his policy had the potential of breaking the vicious circle 
of mutual provocations, allegations, and misperceptions. Further, he enjoyed 
increasing respect for his new foreign policy among the domestic audience, 
disproving conventional belief among the Indian political class that only an 
intransigent stance towards arch rival Pakistan could win domestic approval. As 
head of an increasingly unstable coalition government, and with fierce opposition 
from the scientists and the hawks among the opinion leaders, Gujral was soon 
forced to revise his restrained policy. While rejecting nuclear tests publicly, he was 
not able or willing to stop or significantly slow down the scientists’ work on the 
nuclear programme. When Gujral left office in 1998, preparations on the nuclear 
tests were completed. There was nothing left to do for his successor but to push the 
button. 
In the election campaigns in 1996 and in 1998, the BJP’s manifesto heavily 
appealed to emotions of national pride and prestige. India’s self-respect, 
international status and military prowess was connected to the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. Once in power, this instrumentalisation of the atomic bomb 
foreclosed any room to manoeuvre on the nuclear issue. As he did in 1996, Prime 
Minister Vajpayee authorised nuclear tests immediately after he assumed office in 
1998. Work on a review of strategic policy and the elaboration of a nuclear 
doctrine by his government began only after the tests were executed. 
 
D O M E S T I C  P O L I T I C S  A N D  F O R E I G N  P O L I C Y  
 
The following section deals with the complex system of domestic factors and 
decision-making processes within the Indian polity as intervening variables to 
India’s international behaviour. These variables appear to be of particular 
importance in India considering the substantive record of decisions in the strategic 
and nuclear realm, which were detrimental to India’s security, but nevertheless 
popular among various pressure groups and the public.  
The centrality of the unit-level variations of state interests in the applied model 
is addressed by an analytic narrative of India’s domestic political dynamics as well 
as a clear identification of the main actors within the process of interest 
formulation.  
Policy-making within the nuclear realm has been traditionally made in an ad 
hoc, personalised manner by India’s Prime Minister. His or her decisions were 
based on the advice of few political advisers and the leaders of the nuclear 
scientific community. The almost complete exclusion of the military from nuclear 
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decision-making puts India into an exceptional position within the community of 
nuclear weapon states. Since the nuclear issue entered the broader Indian polity in 
the late 1960s, pressures emerging from the public debate and partisan 
considerations of political actors have a growing effect on the policy-making 
process. 
 
N u c l e a r  D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g  
 
According to the Indian Constitution, Part V, Art. 53 (2), “.. the supreme command 
of the Defence Forces of the Union shall be vested in the President and the exercise 
thereof shall be regulated by law”11. In practical terms, however, the authoritative 
position of the Prime Minister in nuclear policy-making has never been in question. 
The most important advisory body to the Prime Minister is the Cabinet 
Committee on Political Affairs, consisting of four key cabinet ministers. After the 
nuclear tests of 1998, the National Security Council was established in an effort to 
further institutionalise the decision-making process in the strategic realm.  
The legislative branch of the government has only little formal power in the state’s 
strategic policy-making. Since the mid-1960s, only few plenary sessions on this 
issue took place, and the parliament proved rather ineffective in checking and 
balancing government decisions. 
The institutional framework of the nuclear program was laid down in the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1948. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) is designed 
as the main body responsible for the development of the nuclear energy sector.  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs never had much influence on nuclear decision-
making, but it played a crucial role in presenting India’s nuclear policy to the 
international public, as well as representing India in international non-proliferation 
and arms control bodies. The Defence Research and Development Organisation 
(DRDO) is allocated to the Defence Ministry and mainly responsible for India’s 
missile programme. In both, DRDO and Defence Ministry, all key positions are 
strictly in civilian hands. 
The most remarkable feature of Indian nuclear decision-making is the almost 
complete exclusion of the military. Similar to most democratic countries, the 
Indian constitutional framework puts the military under tight civilian control. Many 
scholars regard these rigid constitutional provisions as one of the reasons why India 
was able to maintain its democratic order since independence, in contrast to most 
other post-colonial states. However, the exclusion of the military from Indian 
strategic affairs goes far beyond the normal democratic constraints. Until 1998, no 
effective, institutionalised advisory body to the policy makers involving military 
experts existed. Strategic thinking was mainly done by bureaucrats of the Indian 
Administrative Service (IAS), and by the community of scientists and engineers 
involved in the development of arms. This institutional structure partly explains 
why India’s nuclear programme was primarily designed to simply ‘build the 
bomb’, and only few thoughts were spent on how to actually use it. 
                                                 
11 The Constitution of India, 1950, as amended, Part V, Art. 53 (2). 
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In 1999 the BJP government created the Strategic Policy Group, in which all three 
service chiefs were included. Its main task was to assists the newly created 
National Security Council in developing strategic doctrines and deployment 
postures. 
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uninformed and unprepared. Their often false and fallacious statements caused 
substantive displeasure in other capitals. Particularly the irritating public 
appearance of the Indian government after the nuclear tests in 1998 made the need 
of reforms in those institutions concerned with the nuclear issue become apparent. 
These post hoc reforms started in 1998 by the creation of a National Security 
Council, and the National SecurityAdvisory Board. The board, consisting of 
prominent members of the strategic community, soon elaborated a Draft Report on 
Indian Nuclear Doctrine12, which became the basis of India’s strategic policy. The 
creation of these bodies contributed to an increased transparency in India’s 
strategic discourse. Further, it increased the strategic expertise on which policy 
decisions are made. But the general weaknesses of India’s nuclear policy making 
remain largely untackled: Its proneness to populist considerations, and the 
unfavourable role of certain pressure groups, particularly the community of 
defence scientists. 
 
N U C L E A R  D E C I S I O N - M A K I N G  A N D  
D O M E S T I C  P R E S S U R E  G R O U P S  
 
On January 25th, 2002, India tested a shorter version of its Agni medium-range 
ballistic missile. The main technical purpose of the launch was to test a newly 
developed solid-fuel propellant which would make India’s missile arsenal more 
durable and employable in the field. In military-technical terms, the test flight was 
a rather minor step forward in India’s missile development, and as such would not 
justify a more detailed analysis at this place. A closer look at the circumstances and 
political statements around the event nevertheless reveals much of the dynamics of 
Indian security policy-making. 
The timing of the missile test coincided with India’s Republic Day on January 
26th, on which mobile Agni-missile launchers were part of a large military parade 
in New Delhi. Despite the relatively minor significance of the event, five Cabinet 
Ministers, among them Defence Minister George Fernandes, and all leaders of the 
scientific and strategic community were present at the launch site at Chandipur on 
Wheeler Island off the coast of the Indian state of Orissa. 
In an official press statement, India’s President K.R. Narayanan stated: ”The 
outstanding achievement of our scientists, as represented by this success, will go a 
long way in ensuring self-reliance and indigenisation of our defence production 
capacity”13. This statement shows two main features of India’s nuclear dynamics: 
First, the outstanding position of the defence scientists symbolising India’s 
modernity and technological prowess; and second, the importance of self-reliance 
and indigenisation in the strategic realm. 
                                                 
12 “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine”, 
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html sighted 
on 5 April 2002. 
13 Cited from Aneja, Atul / Sandeep Dikshit: “Short-range Agni test-fired”, The Hindu; 
January 26th 2002. 
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In his statement, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee first of all emphasised the 
relevance of the test to India’s security: “We are taking several steps for the 
nation’s security and protection and Agni is one of them”14. He went on by 
congratulating the defence scientists, and, in a move to soften the expected 
international repercussions, declaring that the missile launch was planned long time 
ago, and that all relevant foreign governments, including the Pakistani, had been 
notified in advance. While a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson explicitly 
declared that “(w)e are not sending any message to anyone. Test-firing of Agni is a 
part of the ongoing missile development programme of India to develop its 
defence”15, Home Minister L.K. Advani welcomed the launch and linked it to the 
ongoing Indo-Pakistani tensions along the Kashmir border. He “ruled out any 
immediate military de-escalation along the border and said it would take a ‘couple 
of months’ for India to judge whether there is any reduction in Pak-sponsored 
terrorism”16. Minister for Science and Technology Murli Manohar Joshi indicated 
that one reason for testing was to demonstrate India’s military prowess vis-à-vis 
Pakistan, as “considering the current geo-political scenario the nation could not be 
left unguarded and testfiring of the Agni is an example of India’s firepower”17. In a 
rare occasion, the opposition Congress Party joined the ruling BJP government in 
congratulating the scientists involved. 
The comments by the main Indian English speaking daily newspapers18 
concurrently describe the event as a “demonstration of its military capability”19 in 
the eve of India’s Republic Day. “New Delhi shut out shuttle diplomacy for a day 
and flexed its military muscle..”20. Despite the government’s official claim that it 
were not directed against any other country, the test is seen by all newspapers in 
the context of the Kashmir dispute, as well as a reaction to reported improvements 
in Pakistan’s missile arsenal.  
All reviewed front page articles emphasise on technical details of the missile 
programme, such as data on range and payload. These data were provided by the 
involved scientists, particularly the DRDO officials in charge of the test, who did 
not miss the opportunity to stress the superiority of the Indian missile systems 
Prithvi and Agni, as compared to the Pakistani Ghauri and Shaheen missiles. 
Further, the scientists distributed information on upcoming missile developments, 
                                                 
14 Cited from “Agni test a step for nation's security: PM”, The Times of India; January 26th 
2002. 
15 Minister of State for External Affairs Omar Abdullah, cited from “Agni test part of 
missile programme: Omar”, The Times of India, January 26th 2002. 
16 Sawant, Gaurav C.: “R-Day march gets a 700-km missile salute”, Indian Express, 
January 26th 2002. 
17 cited from “Short-range Agni missile testfired”, Deccan Herald, January 26th 2002. 
18 Reviewed are the following five daily newspapers: The Hindu, Indian Express, 
Hindustan Times, Deccan Herald, and The Times of India. 
19 cited from Aneja, Atul / Sandeep Dikshit: “Short-range Agni test-fired”, The Hindu; 
January 26th 2002. 
20 Sawant, Gaurav C.: “R-Day march gets a 700-km missile salute”, Indian Express, 
January 26th 2002. 
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such as the introduction of cruise missiles, and the near completion of submarine-
based ballistic missiles21. 
Throughout the newspaper coverage, strategic experts were cited 
anonymously22. Their analyses focus on India’s strategic need for such missile 
systems to create a credible deterrence against regional threats, as “today's test 
could not be seen outside the South Asian ambit involving Pakistan and China - 
two neighbouring countries that have impressive missile capabilities of their 
own”23. In a commentary on the British view of the missile test, Rashmee Z. 
Ahmed agrees that the purely technical reasoning for the timing of the test is 
untenable, and he shares British concerns about its escalating effects on the 
Kashmir dispute. He ends by claiming that “..Britain’s rebuke to India might be 
read as hypocritical, because the British appeared to want India to exercise restraint 
while they kept firm hold of their own delivery system”24. 
In sum, the test-firing of the Agni missile was – in technical terms - one of 
several steps forward in India’s missile build-up. As such, in a different national 
context it probably would have been announced in not more than a communiqué of 
the Defence Ministry. In the Indian domestic context, however, this event was 
played up to a major happening, on which the who-is-who of India’s political, 
scientific, and publicist elite took part, and which was enthusiastically celebrated 
by most of the media and the public at large.  
As this brief outline of the event shows, “(t)he process of building nuclear 
weapon capabilities has created interests, bureaucratic actors, beliefs, perspectives, 
and expectations within the state and society. That is, proliferation qualitatively 
changes the state that engages in it, altering the array of interests that must be 
addressed before unproliferation can occur.” (Perkovich 1998; p.7). 
In the following, the role of two key pressure groups is further examined, 
namely the defence scientific community, and the strategic analysts.  
 
T h e  D e f e n c e  S c i e n t i s t s  
 
The unique position of the defence scientists in India’s strategic policy-making has 
its origins in the congenial relationship between India’s first Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru and the founder of the Indian nuclear programme, Homi Bhabha. 
The scientists’ outstanding role benefits from several favourable features of India’s 
institutional set-up. First of all, all Indian Prime Ministers, with the exception of 
Inder Kumar Gujral, were novices in the field of foreign policy and diplomacy at 
the time they took office. Their ad hoc decisions heavily relied on advice from 
experts. As an institutionalised advisory body was non-existent, and the strategic 
                                                 
21 So far, India does not have appropriate submarines capable of carrying ballistic missile 
launchers. 
22 The only exception being quotations from Defence Studies and Analyses director K 
Santhanam (in Panjit, Rajat: “India tests nuke capable Agni missile”, Times of India, 
January 26th 2002.). 
23 cited from Aneja, Atul / Sandeep Dikshit: “Short-range Agni test-fired”, The Hindu; 
January 26th 2002. 
24 Ahmed, Rashmee Z.: “UK blasts Agni test-launch”, Times of India, January 26th 2002. 
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expertise of the military personnel was widely excluded from decision-making 
institutions, this gap was filled by the defence scientists and engineers, who 
themselves had only limited expertise in strategy and international affairs. The 
scientists enjoyed enormous respect and authority among the political elite and the 
public. Their image fitted perfectly to the anti-colonialist and status oriented 
principles of India’s foreign policy. Their role as single source of information was 
further strengthened by the complexity of the issue, and the general indifference of 
India’s political elite towards international issues. 
Defence scientists based the nuclear programme on self-reliance and 
indigenous development of key technology. The course of the programme was 
shaped along the scientists’ own ideas, and was often detached from practical 
military applicability. For instance, in 1998 the scientists tested a thermonuclear 
device, despite the unanimous understanding of the strategic analysts that India has 
absolutely no security need for the H-Bomb. 
The leading scientists were regularly overwhelmed with enthusiastic lauds 
from the political elite and the media. They received India’s highest civilian 
honours. This admired position became most apparent in July 2002, when the chief 
responsible scientist for India’s nuclear tests, Abdul Kalam, was elected new 
President of India with an overwhelming majority. 
Since the 1990s, the weaponeers made increasing efforts to gain support from 
the military for their ambitious goals. The main reason therefore was their 
realisation that Rao’s policy of scrutinising government spending in the course of 
economic reforms, would make it much more difficult to legitimise nuclear 
spending without clear military applicability. 
The increasing militarisation of the Indian nuclear programme was further 
related to the ongoing decline of the civilian use of nuclear energy, which proved 
not to be economically efficient. The reasons for the decline of the nuclear energy 
sector were manifold. First of all, the expected opportunities and benefits of 
nuclear energy were highly unrealistic right from the beginning. A second reason 
was its strong emphasis on indigenous development, which proved to be more cost 
intensive and constantly caused delays and shutdowns. Self-reliance was further 
coerced by the increasing reluctance of western suppliers to transfer their 
knowledge due to India’s refusal to co-operate in international safeguards and 
control regimes. In 1981 the actual nuclear power capacity was less than one tenth 
of the target originally envisaged by the ten-year plan in 1971; and by the mid-
1990s, the output of India’s nuclear power plants met the 1981 targets by only less 
than one fourth25. 
In sum, the scientific community is a major force behind Indian’s nuclear 
build-up. As Perkovich predicts: “History suggests that even if India signs the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Indian weaponeers will continue to press for 
unending programs to refine nuclear warheads and, more important, extend the 
range and diversity of missile systems” (Perkovich 1999; p.447). This perpetuated 
arms development, which continues widely detached from military-strategic 
                                                 
25 Jones, Rodney W. et.al.: Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 
1998. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1998; p.113. 
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considerations, has been channelled in recent years by efforts to institutionalise the 
nuclear decision-making process. Stopping it, however, would require a 
fundamental shift in media and public perception on the nature, duties and 
responsibilities of the group of defence scientists. 
 
T h e  S t r a t e g i c  A n a l y s t s  
 
The absence of the military in Indian strategic policy-making created space for a 
group of strategic specialists, who exercised strong influence on the elite’s 
understanding of strategic affairs. The most influential group of strategic specialists 
are gathered in the government-funded Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses 
(IDSA) in Delhi, whose published expert reports often reflect in a sense a semi-
official assessment of the current state of strategic affairs in India26. Being sceptical 
about the strategic benefits of a nuclear deterrent throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
IDSA reports since the 1980s were most prominent in developing India’s strategic 
doctrine of minimal nuclear deterrence, which was officially adopted in 1998. The 
experts’ call for clear and effective deployment and targeting strategies often 
collided with the rather status-oriented policy of the political leaders, who tended 
to see nuclear weapons less as strategic, but rather as political and symbolic 
devices. The analysts’ stance further conflicted with the much more ambitious 
interests of the nuclear scientists27.  
 
G o v e r n m e n t  I n s t a b i l i t y  a n d  M a s s  P o l i t i c s  
 
The pros and cons of nuclear weapons have been subject to public debate in India 
more than in any other nuclear weapon state. This exceptional feature explains the 
strong emotionalisation of the debate, but also its lack of strategic profundity. It 
further explains much of the course of ‘keeping the nuclear option open’ followed 
by policy makers until 1998.  
Since a broader public debate on the nuclear issue emerged in the mid-1960s, 
public opinion proved to be highly suggestible by self declared experts and opinion 
leaders. As such, this issue was a tempting device for political leaders to exploit for 
populist purposes. Nehru’s vision of a morally superior foreign policy was 
supported by a vast majority of the public, just as Indira’s course of developing 
nuclear devices ‘for peaceful purposes’, and Morarji Desai’s renewed turn towards 
total rejection of the nuclear option. Prime Minister I.K. Gujral earned much 
domestic approval for his policy of reconciliation towards Pakistan, while his 
successor A.B. Vajpayee gained heavy support from India’s masses for his 
irreconcilable rhetoric on the Kashmir issue and his pro-bomb stance. Public 
support was generated by the BJP through simple slogans propagating weapon 
                                                 
26 Interestingly, current Director of IDSA K. Santhanam, is not a retired high ranking 
military official like most of his predecessors, but himself a former nuclear scientist, who 
made much of his career at BARC and in the DRDO. 
27 This conflict became apparent in the testing of a hydrogen bomb in 1998, which was 
unnecessary in terms of security needs according to the strategists of IDSA. 
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capabilities as indispensable tool to create a strong and proud nation. Questions 
about which strategy to apply, what doctrine to follow, or how much resources to 
allocate were not asked. 
The volatile public opinion was nevertheless guided by several constants: First 
of all, the Indian public is generally inward looking. Domestic issues always 
dominate over issues of foreign policy. Gains in public support for the government 
after the nuclear tests in 1974 and in 1998, as well as during international crises 
such as the Brasstacks crisis of 1987, the Kashmir crisis of 1990, the Kargil 
imbroglio in 1998, and the deployment of troops along the Kashmir border in 
2001/2002 were short-lived, and regularly dismissed by domestic problems within 
few weeks or months.  
A second fixed variable to the dynamics of public opinion is the glorification of 
the weaponeers, symbolising India’s modernity and prowess. 
Finally, India’s public has always been primarily concerned with the perceived 
threat from Pakistan, despite the strategists’ understanding that nuclear weapons 
are of little strategic use in the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, and rather directed against a 
potential Chinese threat. As a survey poll in 1999 showed, 64.2% of the Indian 
electorate consider Pakistan as an enemy state, while only 13.0% perceive China as 
enemy28.  
 
E c o n o m i c  c o n s t r a i n t s  
 
In the course of the public debate on the nuclear issue, the main argument of those 
advocating a rather down-to-earth approach was the enormous financial burden 
which the programme would be for the government’s limited budget, and 
particularly for its foreign currency reserves. The economic argument further 
entered the broader, emotionally heated debate as the opponents of nuclear 
weapons were decrying the immorality of high spending considering the 
widespread poverty in India. Proponents of nuclear weapons countered by claiming 
that it is a state’s top responsibility to provide security as a precondition for 
economic progress. This debate was based on calculations provided by the nuclear 
scientists, who themselves took advantage of their monopoly position as the only 
respected source of information. Their cost estimates were regularly understated, as 
they rarely included costs for command, control and communication, as well as for 
delivery vehicles, which are actually several times higher than the costs for the 
nuclear warhead as such. The political decision-makers had little incentives to 
question the figures provided by the scientists. 
Economic considerations appeared to be the key argument against the 
development of open nuclear capabilities as response to the Chinese tests of 1964. 
Further, Rajiv Gandhi’s decision to delay the deployment of nuclear-capable 
                                                 
28 Survey conducted by the Delhi-based Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, cited 
from Subrata K. Mitra: Emerging Major Powers and the International System: Significance 
of the Indian View. Paper presented at the 2002 RAAF Aerospace Conference on ‘Conflict, 
the State and Aerospace Power: New Perspectives for the Third Millenium’, Canberra, May 
2002. Astonishingly, the same survey reveals that more than one third of the Indian 
electorate (35.7%) even claim to have never heard about China. 
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Prithvi missiles in the late 1980s due to cost calculations prevented the nuclear 
issue from playing a significant role in the Brasstacks Crisis of 1987 and the 
Kashmir Crisis of 1990. The economy-first policy introduced by Narasima Rao in 
1991 again slowed down the nuclear programme. It nevertheless accelerated again 
after the government became increasingly unstable in the mid-1990s.  
Paradoxically, since 1998, economic difficulties and the struggle between pro-
liberalisation and protectionist forces within the BJP government increased the 
attractiveness of nuclear arms. “India’s domestic weaknesses made the economic 
route to international power and status seem less attractive to the BJP than the 
nuclear weapons route. .. . If an economic grand strategy to achieve global power 
and status appeared fraught with severe domestic political difficulties and delays, 
nuclear weapons offered a very simple shortcut” (Perkovich 1999; p.442). 
 
C O N C L U S I O N  
 
In the past decade, a large amount of literature in the field of International 
Relations tried to accommodate major changes in the world order, i.e. the end of 
the Cold War, into new theoretical concepts. The by then dominating features of 
bi-polarity, deterrence, and nuclear arms race were pushed into the background, 
and innovative theoretical concepts, such as Constructivism, tried to capture the 
complexity of the newly emerging international system. 
In this light, research on the Indo-Pakistani antagonism in general, and on the 
introduction of nuclear weapons as deterrence devices into bilateral interaction in 
particular, appears somehow anachronistic.  
The academic appreciation of the South Asian nuclear arms race is nevertheless 
rewarding in several terms: First of all, it reveals the general weakness of the 
theoretical concepts which deal with problems of nuclear arms races, that is, their 
subjectivity to the Cold War context. These Western - or better: American – 
theoretical approaches once allowed policy makers in the United States and in the 
Soviet Union to acquire several thousand nuclear weapons under the pretext of 
security maximising, and labelled such rather bizarre concepts like ‘Mutually 
Assured Destruction’ (MAD) as rational behaviour. When India decided to openly 
declare itself a nuclear weapon state, it explicitly adapted this kind of Western 
strategic thought to justify its action. After the nuclear tests of 1998, Kenneth 
Waltz was as much cited by Indian strategic analysts to express India’s need for 
such weapons, as he was cited by their American counterparts at the heights of the 
Cold War. In both, the South Asian and the Cold War context, the borderline 
between theoretical modelling of nuclear dynamics and ideological backing of 
governmental action became blurred. 
The Indian case nonetheless shows some important deviations from what IR 
theory, particularly Neorealism, would have predicted. Since the first Chinese 
nuclear tests in 1964, theory predicted that India would soon follow suit in order to 
balance Chinese (nuclear) power capabilities. However, India waited some 34 more 
years. 
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Correspondingly, in 1998 the academic back-up of the nuclear tests described the 
open acquisition of nuclear weapons by India as necessary to counter the Chinese 
threat. In this view, the tests of 1998 were necessary for India to achieve deterrence 
stability in its relationship towards China just before the growing pressures 
emerging from the international non-proliferation regime would increase the costs 
of overtly going nuclear to a prohibitive extent. This explanation purely along 
strategic arguments bears one main puzzle: It must have been clear to the 
proponents of India’s nuclearisation that the alleged gains in security vis-à-vis 
China were achieved at the costs of giving up India’s strategic advantage towards 
Pakistan. India traded a rather small – if at all existent – increase in its relative 
power capabilities towards China against a tremendous loss of strategic superiority 
in its relation to Pakistan. As Gwynne Dyer brings it to the point: “..the Vajpayee 
government’s decision four years ago to test Indian nuclear weapons, forcing 
Pakistan to follow suit, was a strategic imbecility: the only war with Pakistan that 
India might not win is a nuclear war”29. 
Beyond strategic arguments, the policy makers’ statements to the domestic 
audience reveal a very different, contradicting motive for India’s nuclear build-up. 
Herein, China was only of lower concern. Nuclear weapons were regarded as show 
of prowess against arch rival Pakistan, and above all as a symbol of status and 
prestige within the community of states in general. Similarly, opinion polls 
regularly show a remarkable indifference among the Indian public towards the 
Chinese threat, whereas the relation to Pakistan appears at the top of public 
concern.  
Many conventional theoretical approaches to the issue limit their scope to 
military-strategic considerations and dismiss the great symbolic value of nuclear 
capabilities as being irrational. Closer analyses of the motives and interests behind 
the South Asian nuclear build-up not only weaken such notion, but in turn might 
give impetus to a re-evaluation of the general nature of nuclear arms. In this 
context, India’s understanding of the nuclear bomb as a symbolic and unusable 
device might be regarded in a certain way as a post-modern approach to strategy. 
While being based on the basic Realist paradigms, the model applied in the 
current study questions the validity of the orthodox systemic orientation of 
Neorealist mainstream. Rather than explaining international outcomes through 
relative power distribution among security-maximising states in the international 
system, it tries to accommodate deviations from security-maximising state 
behaviour by introducing interfering variables at the national level. These variables 
determine the composition of a state’s interests, and the degree to which this 
complex compound of interests is either satisfied by the status quo of the 
international system, or drive the state to pursue its revision.  
Several intervening domestic factors within India’s state interest composition - 
above all the role of certain pressure groups and the peculiarities of the nuclear 
decision-making process - are not accommodated by the existing international 
regime. The most exposed pressure groups behind India’s prestige-oriented pro-
bomb policy are the defence scientists, and circles among opinion leaders and the 
                                                 
29 Gwynne Dyer: ‘The Next Nuclear War’. Express, May 30th 2002. 
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political elite. The personalised, ad hoc fashion of decision-making strongly 
favours these groups, which themselves have only limited expertise in strategic and 
international affairs. On the other hand, the military as the main security-oriented 
group within the Indian domestic arena continues to be largely excluded from 
policy-making.  
The international non-proliferation treaties have been fiercely condemned by 
India as instruments to further consolidate the unfavourable international regime. 
By seeking a revision of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, India 
explicitly accepted the risk that the tentative system change might be 
disadvantageous to its genuine security interests, as it bears the risk of uncontrolled 
spread of nuclear weapons. 
The long period of uncertainty about whether to acquire nuclear weapons or not 
can be explained to a great extent by the dynamics of the Indian democratic 
process. Accordingly, the final decision to openly go nuclear coincided with 
governmental instability and changing majorities within parliament. The short-term 
motive behind the BJP’s decision to conduct the tests in 1998 might be interpreted 
as an attempt to gain public support by populist decisions in order to survive the 
impending vote of confidence. However, a generalisation about the negative effect 
of the democratic process on nuclear build-up cannot be made. In fact, the only 
comparable case of an emerging regional nuclear build-up, i.e. the rivalry between 
Argentina and Brazil, contradicts the South Asian case, as its early termination 
prior to the acquisition of a full-fledged arsenal is commonly explained by public 
pressures emerging after the return of both countries from military to civilian rule 
in the mid-1980s. Both regional cases have in common that the usefulness of 
nuclear weapons was hardly debated along strategic considerations, but rather 
looked at in terms of their role as prestigious symbols of prowess. In the South 
American case, nuclear weapons shifted in public perception from positive 
symbols of national pride and prowess to negative symbols of authoritarian misuse 
of power within a relatively short range of time. In India, it was the political elite 
which played the nuclear card for the purpose of generating public support, while 
the military leadership was rather lavish with the acquisition of such an expensive 
weapon system. Similarly, the Pakistani nuclear programme was initiated by 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto during his short civilian interregnum from 1971 to 1978, and 
fostered during the next period of civilian rule from 1988 to 1999, in which the 
permanently challenged democratic leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, 
tried to exploit public sentiments in favour of the bomb for electoral purposes. 
However, in contrast to the Indian case, within Pakistan security considerations 
always remained paramount, as the main purpose of its nuclear build-up has always 
been the quest for strategic parity vis-à-vis India. 
As the present analysis has shown, intervening domestic factors within India’s 
state interest composition make India act as dissatisfied power, seeking a system 
change in order to satisfy its increasing aspirations. In this context, the acquisition 
of these greatly symbolic devices and India’s self-declaration as nuclear weapon 
state has been the most powerful manifestation of its dissatisfaction with the 
current international regime. Thereby, security considerations appeared to be only 
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of secondary relevance, as nuclear weapons were above all meant to serve India’s 
non-security interests. 
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